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I 
INTRODUCTION 
A hopeful period in the Middle East conflict culminated in a formal peace 
accord between Jordan and Israel in 1994. Disputes over the implementation of 
this agreement arose, however, and by 1997, the positive feelings of the peace 
accord had given way to an escalating war of words between Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Jordan’s King Hussein over Jewish 
settlements. In a letter dated March 9, Hussein warned Netanyahu of 
“inevitable violent resistance” unless Israel relented in its proposal to construct 
a new Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem.1 Netanyahu defensively replied the 
next day that he had “inherited a [peace] process that was failing.”2 On March 
13, a Jordanian soldier opened fire on Israeli girls on a school outing to a nature 
preserve along the Jordan River.3 Seven of the girls were killed.4 Yelling 
“madman,” other Jordanian soldiers restrained the gunman.5 Jordanian officials 
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 1. Serge Schmemann, King Hussein Rebukes Netanyahu for “Intent to Destroy” Peace Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at A1. 
 2. Id.; see also Serge Schmemann, “Fed Up” with Criticism, Netanyahu Lashes Out, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 1997, at A10 (“‘I’m getting frankly fed up with the idea that everything we do is a violation of 
the agreement, and everything the Palestinians say is in compliance with the agreement.’”) (quoting 
Prime Minister Netanyahu). 
 3. Serge Schmemann, Jordanian Soldier Kills 7 Israeli Schoolgirls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at 
A1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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condemned the shooting as “a murderous act carried out by a Jordanian soldier 
on his own,” and vowed to prosecute him “to the full extent of the law.”6 
Israeli officials immediately blamed King Hussein for the attack, saying his 
words were “an invitation to murder.”7 The King denied that the shooting was 
related to his letter, but he cut short a state visit to Spain and traveled to the 
victims’ hometown to meet the grieving parents.8 
Wearing a red-checkered kaffiyeh with his dark suit and accompanied by two of his 
children . . . the King knelt before each of the families in their separate homes as they 
sat on the floor in the Jewish custom for the seven-day mourning period.9 
“I feel that I’ve lost a child,” the King told the parents, promising to spend 
his life pursuing peace and security for all children.10 “[King Hussein] was very 
human, very warm,” one of the parents said.11 The King’s act struck “a deep 
emotional chord”12 among Israelis who followed live broadcasts of the King’s 
visits.13 Cries for revenge simply vanished. 
Thus was the fragile peace agreement between Israel and Jordan protected 
at a moment of extreme peril. Hussein was a powerful leader on one side of a 
group conflict. He apologized to individuals from the opposing group for 
injuries caused by members of his own. The effect was to provide a measure of 
solace to the victims’ families,14 to lessen the desire of the opposing group for 
revenge and retaliation, and to improve the relationship between the groups by 
increasing feelings of empathy.15 
 
 6. Ann LoLordo, Jordanian Soldier Kills Seven Israeli Schoolgirls; 6 More Are Wounded at Scenic 
Border Site Near Jordan River; Other Soldiers Subdue Him; King Hussein Assails Shooting; Abruptly 
Returns from Spain, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 14, 1997, at 1A. 
 7. Liat Collins, Tichon: The Pain is All of Ours, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at 5 (quoting 
Michael Kleiner, head of the Land of Israel Front, describing the letter sent by King Hussein to Prime 
Minister Netanyahu). Another Labor party official said “words can cause madmen to carry out hideous 
crimes.” Id.; see also Ethan Bronner, Jordanian Kills 7 Israeli Girls on Outing, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
14, 1997, at A1 (“‘Recent declarations created a psychological atmosphere that could lead to such tragic 
acts.’”) (quoting Israel’s foreign minister). 
 8. Schmemann, supra note 3; Serge Schmemann, A Time to Mourn: King Hussein Comforts 
Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1997, at A1. 
 9. Schmemann, supra note 8. 
 10. Joel Greenberg, “I Feel I’ve Lost a Child,” King Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, at A6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. For example, an Israeli watching King Hussein’s actions recounted, “[Y]ou could see the 
sadness in his eyes. He is simply human, a human being.” Id. Another Israeli acknowledged, “You see 
that he wants peace.” Id. 
 13. Schmemann, supra note 8. 
 14. Greenberg, supra note 10 (“Ruhama Cohen, who lost her 13-year-old daughter, Keren, had 
been reluctant at first to receive the King, but after his visit she said it had helped her cope with the 
loss. ‘He gave us a good feeling and strengthened us,’ she said.”). 
 15. Greenberg, supra note 10; Schmemann, supra note 8 (“As [Hussein] rose to leave, [the 
grandfather of one of the slain schoolgirls], Nisim Petihi, an immigrant from Yemen, blessed him in 
Arabic.”). 
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Group conflict frequently produces behavior by members of one side that is 
perceived as unjust by those who are harmed on the other side.16 Unless the 
resulting retaliatory urge is blunted or defused in some way, distrust and a 
desire for revenge grow.17 Eventually, some act of real or perceived retaliation 
occurs, and the cycle is repeated in the “cause-effect-effect-effect” pattern or 
the “inexorable chain of causality.”18 This is perpetuated by Rothman’s four 
engines of permanent disputes: 
(1) Blaming the other side for the conflict; 
(2) Polarizing our side against theirs; 
(3) Attributing negative character and disposition to the opponents; 
(4) Projecting unacceptable traits from one’s own side onto another side.19 
The success of King Hussein’s initiative suggests that apology is an 
instrument of leadership that can interrupt this pattern and advance the 
interests of the leader and his group, reducing the desire to retaliate and 
increasing the willingness to cooperate. Put another way, unlike dyadic disputes, 
in which the benefits of apology flow primarily to the recipient, in group 
conflicts the benefits flow equally to the maker. Still, apologies by powerful 
leaders for injuries to members of a competing group are extremely rare. The 
purpose of this article is to explore why this is so. 
Section II describes what typically occurs in a long-standing conflict when 
one group is accused of unjustly harming people from the other side. Leaders 
respond with a standard script that minimizes their responsibility and calls 
attention to the other’s wrongdoing. An apology or even an acknowledgment of 
responsibility for the injury thus represents a significant change in well-settled 
patterns of behavior and attitudes. 
Section III lays out a series of hurdles that stand between a leader and the 
decision to apologize even if doing so would advance the group’s interests. First, 
leaders do not think they need to apologize because their own psychological 
processes screen out or distort information conflicting with their belief that fault 
lies mostly on the other side. Second, even if leaders perceive that facts on the 
ground might call for apology, they find it difficult to get through the 
psychological transition required to change their public identity and behavior. 
 
 16. JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN NATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND COMMUNITIES 23–28 (1997) (arguing that conflict between different groups is inevitable and that 
each side tends to see its own motives in a positive light but to be suspicious of the other’s intentions). 
 17. Tamra Pearson d’Estrée, Dynamics, in CONFLICT: FROM ANALYSIS TO INTERVENTION 68, 73 
(Sandra I. Cheldelin et al. eds., 2003) (describing the spiral of escalation in which “[h]eavy tactics used 
by one party . . . produce certain psychological states in the other party . . . such as blame, anger, fear, 
and threats to image. These psychological states encourage the other party to respond harshly . . . which 
in turn produce[s] these same psychological states in the first party, leading to another harsh 
response.”). 
 18. Danielle Celermajer, From the Levinasian Apology to the Political Apology: Reflections on 
Ethical Politics 6, 12 (Sept. 25–27, 2006) (refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies 
Association conference) (citing HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 241 (1958)). 
 19. ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 24 (numbers and internal punctuation added). 
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Third, the very forces that hold a group together deter its leader from taking the 
political risk of breaking from established patterns. 
Section IV examines how the apology works if a leader can overcome these 
hurdles and apologize. Considering that the same attitudes, beliefs, and habitual 
patterns of response that prevent apology also prevent the receiving group from 
giving the opposing group a fair hearing, how does apology generate 
forbearance and forgiveness? We argue here that an apology bypasses these 
cognitive and social defenses to the extent that listeners perceive it as a 
reenactment of an “archetypal narrative.” 
Section V discusses the implications of this analysis for leaders in group 
conflicts, and argues that three conditions appear to be necessary before an 
effective apology can be expected. First, a degree of ripeness—some 
considerable diminution in hostile attitudes and negative stereotypes sufficient 
to open communication—appears to be a necessary precondition for a leader to 
consider and make an apology. Second, apology is unrealistic without a window 
of opportunity—circumstances allowing the leader to limit the scope of the 
subject matter of the apology. Finally, words alone are not enough. Since a 
positive response requires victims to see a reenactment of an archetypal 
narrative, appropriate rituals and symbolic communication are as important to 
effective apologies as the text. 
II 
DENY AND DEFEND: STANDARD RESPONSES TO INJURY IN GROUP 
CONFLICTS 
Whether the conflict is between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, 
Hutus and Tutsis in Africa, police officers and African American youth in 
Cincinnati, or environmentalists and property owners in California, group 
conflict is a repeat-play game. Over time, each group develops a narrative to 
explain the conflict, a lens through which every event, past and present, is 
interpreted. Each group places the stories of the most egregious behavior of the 
other at the center of the narrative, thereby laying claim to the emotional and 
political rewards that accrue to victims. Beliefs and attitudes are passed on 
regarding the cause of the conflict, who is to blame, and the defensive or 
retaliatory conduct needed for self-protection or to even the score. 
Leaders from opposing groups also have a script to deal with demands for 
acknowledgment, compensation, or apology. For example, if someone from 
group B claims to have been injured by a member of group A, A’s leader will 
respond along the following lines: 
Leader A: The injury did not occur, or if it did occur the claims are exaggerated. 
Leader B: A’s refusal to acknowledge the injury fits the pattern of their past deceit. 
Leader A: If the injury did occur, the member of our group cannot be blamed because 
it was an accident or the result of provocation. 
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Leader B: Claims of “accident” are deceitful and charges of provocation constitute 
“blaming the victim.” 
Leader A: If the perpetrator is blameworthy, the actions cannot be laid to our group 
because he is not a full or legitimate member (for example, an “extremist.”). 
Leader B: The perpetrator is not only a member of A’s group, but the act complained 
of is a product of A’s policies, beliefs, and values. 
Leader A: Even if the perpetrator is a member of our group, the actions were a 
regrettable but understandable consequence from being pushed beyond the breaking 
point by the accumulation of unresolved grievances and injustice from the past. 
Leader B: As to the accumulation of grievances, our cumulative suffering vastly 
exceeds that of the other side. 
Leader A: In any case, Group B is in no position to demand an apology since it has yet 
to apologize for its many past wrongs. 
Leader B: Group A’s failure to apologize demonstrates anew their lack of decency and 
morality. 
These scripts are familiar to leaders and members of both groups, and even 
if a leader expresses some regret for the harm to a particular victim, the message 
is clear: The events have confirmed, rather than altered, the speaker’s 
preexisting narrative. 
This script is illustrated by city officials’ and African American leaders’ 
responses to a tragic episode in the long-simmering conflict between police 
officers and African Americans in Cincinnati, Ohio. On April 7, 2001, at about 
2:15 a.m., Officer Stephen Roach joined pursuit of Timothy Thomas, a 
nineteen-year-old African American wanted by police on fourteen outstanding 
misdemeanor warrants.20 Moments after Roach caught up with Thomas in a 
darkened alley, the youth lay, fatally wounded, the fifteenth person to die at the 
hands of a Cincinnati police officer in six years. All fifteen were African 
American.21 
At first, the mayor and the chief of police stated that the officer had acted in 
self-defense; African American leaders denied the youth was armed. When no 
weapon was found, the officer’s defenders pointed out that it had been dark and 
the youth had reached inside his pocket when ordered to raise his hands. 
African American leaders cited this explanation as proof of the force’s utter 
disregard for the lives of black youth.22 
Tensions mounted until a full-scale civil disturbance broke out in “Over-the-
Rhine,” the predominantly African American, low-income community adjacent 
 
 20. Jane Prendergast & Robert Anglen, Hundreds Protest Police Shooting, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, Apr. 10, 2001, at 1A. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also Dan Horn, The Riots Explode: A City’s Darkest Week, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
Dec. 30, 2001, at 4G (describing the rioting, looting, and overall “urban unrest” that caused the mayor 
of Cincinnati to issue a state of emergency as well as a mandatory curfew in order to quell the tension 
and violence). 
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to the central business district.23 Demonstrators threw rocks and set fires in trash 
cans; police officers responded with horses, tear gas, and rubber bullets to 
enforce the mayor’s emergency twenty-four-hour curfew.24 
Other officers expressed their own doubts about Officer Roach’s version of 
events,25 prompting Mayor Charlie Luken to retreat from his earlier defense. 
Thomas’s mother announced that she had forgiven Officer Roach and pleaded 
for calm.26 While the mayor expressed sorrow over the loss of life, he did not 
acknowledge any wrongdoing by the officer or the police department, and 
instead emphasized his desire to move on, for Thomas’s death to “be a catalyst 
for a new Cincinnati.”27 
The “uprising,” as African Americans called it,28 produced a new group of 
victims: a predominantly white group of small-business owners and investors 
who had been working to create jobs, housing, and economic redevelopment in 
Over-the-Rhine. The script was followed again, this time with the roles 
reversed. African American leaders blamed the police for provoking 
demonstrators, insisted that the youth were pushed beyond the breaking point 
by an accumulation of insults and injustice, and argued that the business owners 
and investors were at fault for failing to put pressure on the mayor over police 
misconduct.29 
The point of this example is not to place blame on Mayor Luken for the civil 
unrest, as others have done.30 It is rather to illustrate the habitual response of 
leaders in group conflicts when a member of their own group is accused of 
wrongdoing. Leaders go through a routine script in which any regret is drowned 
out by defensive, qualified justifications based on preconceived assumptions, 
 
 23. Horn, supra note 22; Francis X. Clines, Appeals for Peace in Ohio After Two Days of Protests, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A18. 
 24. Clines, supra note 23. 
 25. See id. (“‘I have been told [ranking officers] are troubled by the story they are getting,’ Mayor 
Luken said. ‘The initial findings don’t back [Officer Roach] up.’”). 
 26. Gregory Flannery, Mother of the City: Angela Leisure is CityBeat’s 2001 Person of the Year, 
CITYBEAT, Feb. 14, 2002, at 21 (“Without doubt, Mrs. Leisure’s plea for peace and her statement of 
forgiveness for Roach are exemplary.”); The Early Show: Angela Leisure, Mother of Slain Teenager in 
Cincinnati, Talks About the Incident (CBS television broadcast Apr. 13, 2001). 
 27. Doug Trapp, Firing on Children: Now You Know Why People Run from Cincinnati Police, 
CITYBEAT, Apr. 19, 2001, at 16. 
 28. Gregory Flannery, Long Live the Rebellion: Five Years Later, We’re Still Learning About Our 
‘Riot’,’ CITYBEAT, Apr. 5, 2006, at 20–21, available at http://www.citybeat.com/cincinnati/article-930-
cover-story-long-live-the-rebellion.html (“Politicians and church groups prefer to speak of ‘civil 
unrest,’” whereas African Americans and activists insist “‘[u]prising’ is a much better name for it” 
because “[p]eople were rebelling against injustice.”). 
 29. Trapp, supra note 27; see also Horn, supra note 22 (“Businesses suffered hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in damage. . . . ‘Just when things are turning the corner—a lot of reinvestment occurring in 
the city—there is this destruction.’”). 
 30. See, e.g., Gregory Flannery, Mayor Hunky Dory: Black Rage Seems a Mystery to White 
Leaders, CITYBEAT, Apr. 19, 2001, at 14 (“Demonstrator Donald Warfield says he’ll put it real simple 
for this white reporter. ‘All the mayor’s got to do is apologize to people for what the f**k the police 
done,’ Warfield says. ‘He could have calmed this s**t down.’”). 
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even when an effective apology might advance the interests of their group. 
Assuming this is so, what prevents leaders from doing what is called for? 
III 
SOURCES OF A GROUP-CONFLICT LEADER’S RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
To depart from the standard script and apologize requires a leader to break 
from habitual patterns of behavior and to change previously held beliefs and 
attitudes about her group, the opposing group, and the conflict. Seen in this 
light, apology is a subset of a much larger category: actions that require changes 
in entrenched attitudes, beliefs, or habits. The human tendency to resist change 
has been the subject of considerable academic study in many fields. This section 
will discuss insights from the fields of public health, social psychology, political 
psychology, public policy, and business management that are particularly 
helpful to explain why leaders in group conflicts might fail to seize or even to 
recognize an opportunity for the effective use of apology. 
A. Behavioral Health and Psychological Resistance 
Some of the most extensive scholarship on behavioral change comes from 
the world of public health. One widely used model for treatment of patients 
who must change their behavior in order to move toward a healthier lifestyle, 
for example, smoking or chemical-abuse cessation, arthritis self-management, 
or weight reduction, tracks a number of steps.31 According to this model, 
individuals move through six stages to achieve sustainable change: (1) 
precontemplation, (2) contemplation, (3) preparation, (4) action, (5) 
maintenance, and (6) termination.32 In the “precontemplation” period, the 
 
 31. James O. Prochaska & Carlo C. DiClemente, Transtheoretical Therapy: Toward a More 
Integrative Model of Change, 19 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY RES. & PRAC. 276, 282–85 (1982) 
(identifying four stages of the process of change, as well as the preceding and following stages of 
precontemplation and termination). The main stages were initially identified as contemplation, 
determination, action, and maintenance. Later, the researchers renamed “determination” as 
“preparation.” See, e.g., James O. Prochaska et al., Stages of Change and Decisional Balance for 12 
Problem Behaviors, 13 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 39, 40 (1994); see also James O Prochaska & John C. 
Norcross, Stages of Change, 38 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY RES. PRAC. TRAINING 443, 443–44 (2001) 
(defining all six stages). 
 32. Id. This model is known as the “transtheoretical” or “stages of change” model. See James O. 
Prochaska & Carlo C. DiClemente, The Stages and Processes of Self-Change in Smoking: Towards an 
Integrative Model of Change, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 390, 391, 393 (1983) (confirming 
that “[b]ecause precontemplators tend to be defensive and avoid changing their thinking and 
behavior,” those smokers placed in the precontemplation stage (no intention to quit smoking within 
one year) “used the processes of change . . . less than subjects in any other stage”). Not all public-health 
scholars accept the model proposed by Prochaska and others. See, e.g., Robert West, Time for a 
Change: Putting the Transtheoretical (Stages of Change) Model to Rest, 100 ADDICTION 1036, 1036–39 
(2005) (arguing that the transtheoretical model arbitrarily classifies persons in particular stages of 
change, fails to account for many forces and motivations that generate different behaviors, especially 
addiction, as well as reward and punishment, and is unable to make substantial predictions “beyond 
those that could be made from common sense”); Robert West, The Transtheoretical Model of 
Behaviour Change and the Scientific Method, 101 ADDICTION 774, 774–78 (2006) (“There appears to be 
no evidence that tailoring brief opportunistic advice to stop smoking to stage of change is more 
effective than simply advising all-comers to stop and offering them treatment to help.”). But see James 
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person has formed no intention to change and either does not recognize or is in 
denial about the existence of a problem. In the “contemplation” phase, the 
person becomes aware of the problem and considers whether to attempt 
change. “Preparation” includes the person’s taking baby steps toward a change; 
“action” is her making substantial and overt behavioral changes. 
“Maintenance” is incorporating the new behavior and making efforts to prevent 
relapse. “Termination” signals the completed adoption of the change. In real 
life, unlike the model, the process is not necessarily linear, and frequent 
backsliding is the norm. 
Applying this model to group conflict, a robust apology is an “action” that 
will not occur until a leader has moved from precontemplation through 
contemplation and preparation. In the Jordan–Israel example, King Hussein 
had been personally involved in negotiations with Israelis over several years,33 
and he had personal relationships with key Israeli leaders.34 Indeed, the war-like 
rhetoric leading up to the border incident may actually have represented a 
relapse into old patterns. In contrast, in the months leading up to the Thomas 
incident in Cincinnati, Mayor Luken had been involved in a heated and highly 
personal dispute with civil-rights leaders over alleged racial profiling and misuse 
of force by the Cincinnati police.35 Luken (and, it might be added, his critics) 
appeared to be stalled in the precontemplation stage. 
B. Cognitive and Emotional Resistance 
Designating an apology an “action” preceded by many smaller steps does 
not explain why so few leaders make the effort to apologize. Adapting to new 
circumstances is one of the core skills of a political leader. Social psychology 
literature suggests a partial answer: leaders caught in group conflicts 
unconsciously screen out, invalidate, counterattack, or forget information 
inconsistent with their established attitudes36 about the conflict and the other. 
 
O. Prochaska, Moving Beyond the Transtheoretical Mode, 101 ADDICTION 768, 768–74 (2006) 
(responding to West’s principal criticisms and defending the transtheoretical model as applicable to 
entire populations and especially essential for studying and serving individuals who are unmotivated to 
change their behavior, which traditional models of behavior change avoided). 
 33. Deborah Sontag, Death of a King: In Jerusalem, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A13 (recounting 
that prior to the 1994 peace treaty, King Hussein was involved in secret negotiations with Yitzhak 
Rabin and other Israeli leaders). 
 34. The Rabin Funeral; Words of Respect, Love, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1995, at A21 (quoting excerpts 
from King Hussein’s eulogy at the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, grieving “the loss of 
a brother, a colleague and a friend”). 
 35. Jane Prendergast, ACLU Aids Protest of Profiling, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 21, 2000, at 
1B (noting that “trust is gone” for “many in the African-American community”); Jane Prendergast & 
Marie McCain, ACLU Weighs Suit on Profiling, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 31, 2001, at 2B 
(“[L]eaders of the community action group Cincinnati Black United Front said discussion with 
Cincinnati police had done little to solve the problem.”). Less than one month before the Timothy 
Thomas incident, a group of black civil-rights groups and ACLU attorneys filed a federal complaint 
that alleged racially discriminatory police practices by the Cincinnati police force. See In re Cincinnati 
Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 36. Attitude is defined in social psychology as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by 
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor.” Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, 
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An attitude is composed of an associative neural network among thoughts, 
images, and feelings associated with a person, place, group, issue, or idea, and a 
position of like–dislike, for–against.37 These neural connections become stronger 
when continually reinforced by new encounters with information and other 
people.38 Particularly strong and resistant to change are attitudes with ego 
involvement or linkage to self-defining reference groups,39 as well as attitudes 
formed from salient or searing emotional experiences that have made us who 
we are.40 Social psychologists agree that the stronger the attitude, the more it 
tends to resist change: “Both high theory and common sense converge to say 
that a strong attitude is one that will endure, will resist attempts at persuasion in 
contrary directions, will exert influence on the formation of related perceptions 
and beliefs, and—perhaps most important—will predict behavioral decisions 
with highest fidelity.”41 
The annealing fire of conflict magnifies and strengthens the link between a 
group narrative and personal identity.42 The narrative of a group regarding the 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 1 (1993); see also Dolores Albarracín et al., Attitudes: Introduction 
and Scope, in THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES 3, 4 (Dolores Albarracín et al. eds., 2005) (referring to 
this definition of “attitude” as “the most conventional contemporary definition”). As a term of art in 
this field, the term “attitude” is distinct from “belief.” “Beliefs are cognitions [thoughts] about the 
probability that an object or event is associated with a given attribute.” Id. at 3. An attitude can be 
formed based upon a belief, an emotion, or a past behavior with regard to a particular person, group, 
idea, issue, or object. See id. at 3–5. 
 37. DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF 
THE NATION 3, 52, 83–87, 264 (2007) (noting that the concept of frames used by political psychologists 
is similar); Dan Cassino et al., Information and Public Opinion, 48 POLITISCHE 
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 205, 207–09 (2007) (F.R.G.) (describing the associative-network model of 
understanding human memory of information, entities, emotions, and attitudes). Alternatively, social 
psychologists have envisioned a connectionist-network model, which can be analogized to a computer 
screen. A single pixel has no assigned meaning in and of itself; however, numerous pixels are activated 
in distinct patterns to represent an entity. See, e.g., Frederica R. Conrey & Eliot R. Smith, Attitude 
Representation: Attitudes as Patterns in a Distributed, Connectionist Representational System, 25 SOC. 
COGNITION 718, 718–20 (2007) (“A distributed, connectionist network processes information in the 
form of flows of activation across the connections between the units. Each unit receives input over 
incoming connections from other units, and integrates those signals to determine its own activation at 
the next moment in time.”). 
 38. Cassino et al., supra note 37 at 208–09 (describing how the level of activation of nodes in 
tandem spreads “automatically and quickly” upon receiving new information from environmental 
stimulation, such as reading about a particular subject); see also Robert C. Malenka & Roger A. Nicoll, 
Long-Term Potentiation—A Decade of Progress?, 285 SCIENCE 1870, 1870 (1999) (“[R]epetitive 
activation of excitatory synapses in the hippocampus, a brain region long known to be essential for 
learning and memory, cause[s] an increase in synaptic strength . . . known as long-term potentiation. . . . 
[S]trong activation of one set of synapses can facilitate [long-term potentiation] at an independent set 
of adjacent synapses on the same cell if both sets of synapses are activated within a finite temporal 
window.”). 
 39. Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 269, 289 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., 4th ed. 1998). 
 40. Wendy Wood et al., Working Knowledge and Attitude Strength: An Information-Processing 
Analysis, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 283, 290–91 (Richard E. 
Petty & Jon A. Krosnick eds., 1995) (describing how attitude strength increases when a high degree of 
affect is associated with the attitude object, such as with “the highly pitched emotional arguments 
associated with abortion”). 
 41. Phillip E. Converse, Foreword to ATTITUDE STRENGTH, supra note 40, at xi. 
 42. ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 5–8. 
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conflict, like other hierarchical belief structures or ideologies, triggers a “top-
down” cognitive process in shaping the formation of related attitudes toward 
each new event, issue, or person.43 These attitude structures become a part of 
the leader’s, as well as the group members’, self-concept. Leaders maintain and 
disseminate the group narrative among the members, and new members are 
socialized to the beliefs about the conflict and about the other side. The more 
embedded in an overarching belief structure an attitude is, the more deeply a 
person will resist a change in any position or attitude that might have a ripple 
effect of forcing a reassessment in one’s entire belief system.44 
Powerful unconscious psychological mechanisms are at work to preserve the 
stability of the self-concept. Resistance to change of attitudes can take the form 
of selective cognitive processes such as selective exposure and attention, biased 
assimilation, and selective memory. First, people seek out and pay attention to 
information that supports attitudes to which they are strongly committed; and 
they screen out and ignore incongruent information. For example, despite the 
effort required to avoid the bombardment of news coverage on such an event as 
Watergate, Nixon supporters selectively avoided learning about the hearings 
that posed a powerful challenge to their beliefs about him.45 
In a protracted conflict, each side develops its own channels for distribution 
of its own worldview, and members of a group do not seek out the other side’s 
sources.46 The current media environment, where each side of the political 
divide has its own television channels, radio stations, and websites, has the 
effect of a de facto selective avoidance in that people are rarely exposed to both 
sides of the issue unless they actively seek out sources on both sides. 
Once a person’s attention is engaged, the rational expectation is that a 
careful examination of conflicting evidence and arguments will result in the 
weakening of a polarized position. A person receiving information or data 
inconsistent with a strongly held attitude, however, will not process this 
incoming information impartially. Such biased assimilation, a second cognitive 
process contributing to one’s resistance to change, is illustrated in a classic study 
 
 43. See Daniel Bar-Tal, From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: 
Psychological Analysis, 21 POL. PSYCHOL. 351, 354 (2000) (“Leaders and mass media form beliefs to 
explain the causes of the conflict, its nature, and its solution to group members. Cultural, educational, 
social, and political mechanisms are mobilized to impart these beliefs to society members and maintain 
them during the conflict.”). 
 44. Eagly & Chaiken, supra note 39, at 289. 
 45. Paul D. Sweeney & Kathy L. Gruber, Selective Exposure: Voter Information Preferences and 
the Watergate Affair, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1208, 1208–16 (1984) (documenting how 
study participants identified as “Nixon supporters” reported less interest, attention, and knowledge 
regarding the Watergate affair and were more inclined to agree that Nixon had not lost credibility and 
should remain in office than those persons designated as “McGovern supporters” or “undecided” in the 
same study). 
 46. Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 
50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755, 763–764 (2006) (finding participants were more likely to search for and to read 
the arguments of a sympathetic issue group than to search out the arguments of the opposing groups). 
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performed at Stanford University in 1979.47 When presented with purportedly 
equally valid empirical studies on the deterrent effect of the death penalty, 
students automatically accepted the validity of the study that favored their 
preexisting positions, while deconstructing and attacking the methods of the 
opposing study.48 In fact, reading the opposing study not only failed to convince 
the students to moderate or to change their positions, but the students became 
even more convinced that their preexisting position was correct.49 These effects 
of biased assimilation and increased polarization operate in group conflicts to 
aggravate antagonism because neither side can understand why the other 
refuses to see reality.50 
Selective memory is yet another cognitive process occurring below the 
consciousness radar to resist change in an established attitude or opinion. A 
more recent study found that participants whose position on the issue of capital 
punishment was deeply embedded into their self-concept, value system, and 
knowledge structure tended to recall more of studies and newspaper articles 
supporting their position than of those in opposition.51 This study and other 
progeny of the Stanford study, though, focus exclusively on the psychology of 
cognitive processes, presenting biased assimilation as a purely cognitive 
phenomenon, with little emphasis on the influences of emotions.52 
 
 47. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 
(1979) (“People who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to examine relevant 
empirical evidence in a biased manner.”). Many researchers have confirmed the effect of biased 
assimilation with different forms of information presented on myriad issues. See, e.g., Geoffrey D. 
Munro et al., Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential 
Debate, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 15, 16 (2002) (collecting replications of the 1979 Lord et 
al. study). In addition, the Munro study found viewers of the first 1996 U.S. presidential debate rated 
the arguments made by their predebate favored candidates more highly than arguments disconfirming 
their predebate attitudes about their favored candidate. Id. at 24. However, social psychologists 
continue to debate the implications and validity of these studies. See, e.g., Eva M. Pomerantz et al., 
Attitude Strength and Resistance Processes, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 408, 408 n.1 (1995) 
(“[W]e prefer not to use this term [biased assimilation] as it implies biased cognitive-processing of 
attitude-relevant information, and such processing has heretofore never been empirically demonstrated 
to accompany the judgment effect.”). 
 48. Lord et al., supra note 47, at 2101–02. The researchers in this 1979 study controlled for 
potential differences arising from the order in which the competing empirical studies on deterrence 
were presented to proponents and opponents of the death penalty by giving half of each group of 
students the “prodeterrence” study first, while the other half of each student group received the 
“antideterrence” study first. Id. at 2100. 
 49. Id. at 2104–06. 
 50. See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 26 (“The self-perceptions and attributions of opponents are 
often diametrically opposed.”). 
 51. See Pomerantz et al., supra note 47, at 412 (“Embeddedness” was measured by “[p]articipants’ 
self-reports of how central their attitude [was] to their self-concept, . . . how representative of their 
values their attitude [was], and how knowledgeable they [were] on the topic.”). 
 52. See Munro et al., supra note 47, at 17 (stating that the 1979 study conducted by Lord et al., 
though consistent with the research of its time, overlooked the role of emotion by focusing only on the 
cognitive nature of biased assimilation). See generally Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 39, at 591, 594–96 (observing that this was the first time a chapter on 
emotions was included in the Handbook and that the topic of emotions was “neglected for decades”). 
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Yet recent research has found that these selective-processing processes are 
driven by emotions of which people are unaware.53 Heightened emotional 
involvement with a position increases motivation for biased processing.54 The 
more-informed or politically savvy person is actually more susceptible to the 
biases because he possesses a greater store of knowledge with which to attack 
the incoming challenge.55 None of these selective processes is used intentionally 
to block out the viewpoint of the other side, even though people usually 
attribute intentionality to each other in a dispute.56 Emotions run highest in 
protracted group conflicts. Each side believes it is right; each has invested much 
cognitive energy into developing and maintaining its perspective on the conflict, 
the needs it has, and the goals for which it strives.57 
Advancements in neuroimaging technology now provide a window into the 
actual neural processes behind these screening phenomena. With this 
technology, Antonio Damasio discovered that emotional systems previously 
thought to be inoperative during “rational” thought have been shown to 
actively aid and participate in decisionmaking.58 Using a neuroimaging study of 
neural processes, recent research has confirmed the underlying emotional 
involvement in judging political candidates’ inconsistent statements.59 When 
politically active participants were confronted with a set of blatantly 
contradictory statements by their favored candidate in an election, the 
 
 53. See Taber & Lodge, supra note 46, at 757 (“[P]eople are largely unaware of the power of their 
priors.”); Cassino et al., supra note 37, at 215 (discussing studies that found unconscious and automatic 
underpinnings of thought to be more indicative of physiological measures of racism than conscious and 
explicit attitudes). 
 54. See Munro et al., supra note 47, at 25 (noting that the participants’ analyses of debate 
arguments hinged on the participants’ affective responses to the presidential candidates). 
 55. See Taber & Lodge, supra note 46, at 763–65 (finding that students with more political-science 
knowledge chose to consider arguments on divisive political issues from sympathetic sources more than 
seventy percent of the time); Pomerantz et al., supra note 47, at 408 (collecting studies that show 
greater knowledge about an issue is correlated with greater attitude polarization and a greater 
resistance to change positions); see also Wood et al., supra note 40, at 283, 284 (“Knowledgeable people 
with strong attitudes are careful, expert processors of new information, but their processing is biased to 
bolster and protect their favored attitude position.”). 
 56. See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 26–27 (arguing that parties in conflict “perpetuate blame” by 
attributing the actions of their adversaries to “a “fundamental aspect of their character” so that the 
other side is seen as “innately hostile”). 
 57. Paul A. Sabatier, Policy Change over a Decade or More, in POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING: 
AN ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH 13, 33 (Paul Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993). 
 58. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN xvii (1994) (“[C]ertain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for 
rationality. . . . [H]uman reason depends on several brain systems, working in concert across many 
levels of neuronal organization, rather than on a single brain center. Both ‘high-level’ and ‘low-level’ 
brain regions, from the prefrontal cortices to the hypothalamus and brain stem, cooperate in the 
making of reason.”); Rose McDermott, The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific 
Advances for Political Science, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 691, 693–94 (2004) (summarizing the Damasio study). 
 59. See Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional 
Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 18 J. COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 1947, 1947–55 (2006) (evaluating how people reason to political judgments by 
measuring the neural activity of strongly partisan supporters of presidential candidates when presented 
with statements appearing detrimental to their chosen candidate and then presented with 
corresponding and seemingly exculpatory statements that explain away the apparent inconsistency). 
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participants minimized their distress by quickly “rationalizing” away the 
inconsistencies, but not through the “rational” or “cold-reasoning” part of the 
brain (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).60 Active instead were areas of the brain 
devoted to emotional appraisal, suppression of negative emotional stimuli, 
judgments of forgivability, and emotionally laden moral judgments. This 
process took place so quickly that the participants were not even aware of it. 
And, not only did the participants minimize the obvious discrepancies, but their 
“reward circuits” became activated as they did so.61 This study added the insight 
that defending against information that challenges people’s settled position 
actually makes them feel good. 
This research helps to explain why leaders in group conflicts remain in a 
precontemplation phase. Even in the face of overwhelming evidence, leaders 
rarely apologize because their conception of “reality” is that they have done the 
lesser wrong and that it is the other side that should apologize. Assuming a 
leader is able to contemplate an apology, at least one further hurdle remains. 
Organizational-development specialist William Bridges argues that change is 
accompanied by a process of psychological “transition” that involves letting go 
of the familiar (“ending”) and enduring a period of ambiguity (“neutral zone”) 
before the person can comfortably behave in a different way (“new 
beginning”).62 Even if change is plainly needed, endings generate sadness, 
resentment, anger, and anxiety, which combine to create a sort of emotional 
drag to delay or even sabotage the will to act.63 The neutral-zone period holds 
both the potential for creative solutions and the danger of regression—even a 
bad situation can look better than an uncertain future.64 In the new beginning, 
people are accustomed to the new reality, new habits, and changed attitudes.65 
Bridges distinguishes between changes imposed by external forces, such as 
the loss of a loved one, and those authored by individuals on their own volition, 
such as acknowledging an addiction or changing careers. In the latter case he 
 
 60. Id. at 1955. 
 61. Id. at 1956. 
 62. WILLIAM BRIDGES, MANAGING TRANSITIONS: MAKING THE MOST OF CHANGE 4–5 (2d ed. 
2003). Bridges drew from Arnold van Gennep’s work on rites of passage in anthropology, id. at 56, as 
well as from Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s grief-stages model in psychotherapy. See ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, 
THE RITES OF PASSAGE 10–11 (Monika B. Vizedom & Gabrielle L. Caffee trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 
1960) (1909); ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969) (identifying the five stages of 
handling grief as denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance). In his 
introduction to The Rites of Passage, Solon Kimball notes that “rites of passage” may have been more 
properly translated as “rites of transition.” Solon T. Kimball, Introduction to THE RITES OF PASSAGE, 
supra, at v, vii. Discussing territorial passages, van Gennep noted that European countries in the past 
were surrounded by a strip of neutral ground that he referred to as a “neutral zone.” Though such areas 
of “no man’s land” have gradually disappeared, the term “letter of marquee” retains the definition of 
“a permit to pass from one territory to another through a neutral zone.” VAN GENNEP, supra, at 17–18. 
Bridges adopted the term “neutral zone,” even though emotions during the time of transition are 
anything but neutral. 
 63. BRIDGES, supra note 62, at 28–30, 140. 
 64. Id. at 39–43. 
 65. Id. at 5, 58. 
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argues that a “developmental transition” precedes the changed behavior.66 
Applying this framework, an apology must be preceded by a developmental 
transition requiring the leader to relinquish, at least to some degree, a 
comfortable narrative that characterizes the conflict as good (us) versus evil 
(them). The Bridges framework helps to explain why people, leaders included, 
fail to act even after the logic of change becomes overwhelming. 
Change can and does occur, of course, and people do move from 
contemplation and preparation to action. Social scientists hypothesize that upon 
the accumulation of numerous bits of disconfirming information over a period 
of time, an established attitude may be gradually undermined by the strength 
and volume of evidence to the contrary.67 Or, in the alternative, an event or a 
reframing of the issue can trigger a shift to an entirely different neural 
associative network and cause a reevaluation of the attitude or belief.68 In any 
event, a significant change of heart about the other side will require a leader to 
make a considerable effort to become aware of and to resist cognitive processes 
and emotional attachments that powerfully and persistently blind her from 
seeing their point of view. 
C. Influences from Within the Leader’s Group 
Leaders are also subject to pressures from within their own groups, which 
compounds their propensity to resist change. Group norms prevent leaders, as 
well as group members, from considering or acting on ideas or information that 
contradict the group’s important beliefs. When there is strong social influence 
on a person regarding a particular group standard, she will resist change more 
strongly the further she is asked to depart from it; and only if the group 
standard is changed will this resistance be eliminated.69 
The Bridges framework represents a modern application of one of the 
earliest social-psychological models of group change developed by Kurt Lewin 
in 1951 as part of his “field theory.”70 Lewin argued that a group necessarily 
 
 66. WILLIAM BRIDGES, THE WAY OF TRANSITION 4–5 (2001); see also Prochaska & DiClemente, 
supra note 31, at 282–84; Prochaska & DiClemente, supra note 32, at 393–94 (arguing that addicts must 
pass through precontemplation, contemplation, and preparation before an action can be expected). 
 67. See Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Strength, Attitude Structure, and Resistance to 
Change, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH, supra note 40, at 413, 427 (“[M]assive inputs would be 
recommended to those interested in changing attitudes . . . especially inputs that span the range . . . 
from cognitive through affective through behavioral.”); Hank C. Jenkins-Smith & Paul A. Sabatier, The 
Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning, in POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING, supra note 57, at 41–42 
(stipulating that the accumulation of technical information over a long period of time may gradually 
change the central elements of an advocacy coalition’s belief system). 
 68. WESTEN, supra note 37, at 264. 
 69. KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL PAPERS 225–28, 
231, 234 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1951). 
 70. See generally Shelley E. Taylor, The Social Being in Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 39, at 58, 60 (describing Lewin’s field theory as “a quasi-
mathematical model of forces in the field designed to predict behavior and behavior change in response 
to changes in various environmental forces”). Lewin borrowed terminology from force-field physics to 
describe individual’s actions as well as group dynamics. 
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passes through three stages in order for a change to be sustained. The first stage 
he called “unfreezing”—overcoming inertia and dismantling the existing “mind 
set.”71 Lewin observed that a catharsis might be needed to remove these 
prejudices: “To break open the shell of complacency and self-righteousness it is 
sometimes necessary to bring about deliberately an emotional stir-up.”72 The 
second stage toward change is a period of confusion, a moving to a new level.73 
The third and final stage is “freezing group life on the new level.”74 In the third 
stage, the new mindset stabilizes and the group’s comfort level returns to 
previous levels.75 Lewin observes that a group’s reaching the next level is not as 
important as its staying there: 
A change toward a higher level of group performance is frequently short-lived; after a 
“shot in the arm,” group life soon returns to the previous level. This indicates that it 
does not suffice to define the objective of a planned change in group performance as 
the reaching of a different level. Permanency of the new level, or permanency for a 
desired period, should be included in the objective. . . . Since any level is determined 
by a force field, permanency implies that the new force field is made relatively secure 
against change.76 
Bridges would add to the Lewin framework the caveat that the individuals 
in the group will move through the stages of change at different speeds. His 
term for this phenomenon is the “marathon effect.”77 Like the fastest runners in 
a marathon, the leaders are in the winners’ tent about the time the majority of 
the crowd is just getting started.78 
It is easy for U.S. citizens to see and criticize the operation of group norms 
in distant conflicts between Arabs and Israelis, Turks and Armenians, or Shiites 
and Sunnis. Group dynamics also cause resistance to change closer to home. 
Political scientist Paul Sabatier has studied a number of U.S. policy disputes, 
including those over air pollution, water policy, and land use.79 He found that 
sustained public-policy disputes spawn “advocacy coalitions,” nonhierarchical 
collections of individuals, informal groups, and organizations held together by a 
complex system of shared beliefs, values, and attitudes.80 For example, the pro-
choice and pro-life advocacy coalitions in the United States involve huge 
numbers of Americans who are tied together by nothing more formal than 
sharing values, perceptions of causal relationships, and world views on abortion. 
 
 71. Id. at 229. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 228–29. 
 74. Id. at 228, 231. 
 75. Id. at 231. 
 76. Id. at 228–29. 
 77. BRIDGES, supra note 62, at 65. 
 78. Id. at 65–66. 
 79. See Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, supra note 67, at 41–45; Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-
Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
117, 126 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 1999) (listing studies by researchers in the United States and other 
countries that tested the advocacy coalition framework in a variety of policy domains, including 
education, national defense, telecommunications, drugs, infrastructure, and gender discrimination). 
 80. Sabatier, supra note 57, at 25–27. 
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Members of advocacy coalitions strongly resist “information suggesting that 
their basic beliefs may be invalid or unattainable, and they will use formal 
policy analyses primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs (or attack their 
opponents’ views).”81 Any proposition that challenges one of the core beliefs, 
values, or attitudes behind an advocacy coalition will be perceived as an 
existential threat of attack. Over time, the rhetorical exchanges in the media 
and in fundraising appeals “tend to transform opponents from responsible 
adversaries into people with extreme and dangerous views,”82 a process Sabatier 
calls “the devil shift.”83 
When a leader has moved beyond the devil shift and is able to humanize the 
other side, he may face strong resistance from the members of his group who 
have not been able to even begin to contemplate such a change. This “marathon 
effect” can have serious consequences. For example, the experience of the 
leader of the British group League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) is instructive. 
Executive Director Jim Barrington won media attention for LACS with clever 
and sometimes vicious attacks on prominent people—especially members of the 
Royal Family—for participating in “blood sports.” After engaging in dialogue 
and negotiations with leaders from the opposition, he conceded to a reporter 
that it was “worthwhile talking to the hunting fraternity,” many of whom were 
actually “respectable” people.84 Regional and local LACS leaders—his natural 
competitors within the group—immediately assailed him for “bringing (the 
league) into disrepute, seriously disconcerting its friends [and] providing 
comfort to its enemies.”85 
After Barrington was forced out, a thoughtful editorial in the Times of 
London opined that his fate was a warning of sorts to leaders who represent 
their members with “strident, uncompromising” tactics.86 For leaders to publicly 
shift their view “inflicts . . . a mortal blow . . . to the morale of fellow 
campaigners. They expect to change the minds and laws of society; they do not 
expect society to change their own views.”87 Interestingly, Barrington’s successor, 
 
 81. Id. at 19. 
 82. Paul Sabatier et al., The Devil Shift: Perceptions and Misperceptions of Opponents, 40 W. POL. 
Q. 449, 452 (1987). One of the co-authors of this article argued that advocates who perceive themselves 
as dealing with enemies tend to over-utilize coercive “push” strategies and view cooperative “pull” 
strategies as naïve, useless or even dangerous. Roger L. Conner, Strategy and Stance: A Framework for 
Understanding Public Advocacy 8–13 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 110501, Nov. 
20, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=862244. He refers to this resulting cycle of attack and 
defense as the “Advocacy Trap.” Id. at 13. 
 83. Sabatier, supra note 82, at 450 (“[A]ctors perceive opponents to be stronger and more ‘evil’ 
than they actually are.”). 
 84. Michael Hornsby, Anti-Hunt Chief Hails Sport’s Tradition, TIMES (London), Nov. 3, 1995, at 5. 
 85. Michael Hornsby, Wildlife Activists Step up Pressure on League Head, TIMES (London), Nov. 
22, 1995, at 7. 
 86. Lead Article, No Blinkers; Praise for the Cruel Sports Man Who Changed His Mind, TIMES 
(London), Nov. 22, 1995, at 19. 
 87. Id. 
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Graham Sirl, was also replaced after moderating his views,88 leading to the 
installation of a new chair who describes her approach to advocacy as 
“impatient, intolerant, judgmental, tactless . . . [a]nd if you don’t do it my way, 
by God you’ll be sorry.”89 
These examples of the marathon effect suggest that powerful group norms 
keep leaders in the precontemplation stage and make it risky to move through 
contemplation to planning and action. Assuming that a leader navigates these 
obstacles, a further hurdle remains: the same individual- and group processes 
are operating on the other side to prevent them from changing and offering 
forbearance or forgiveness in response. 
IV 
WHY AND HOW APOLOGY WORKS: THE POWER OF AN ARCHETYPAL 
NARRATIVE AND SYMBOLIC RITUALS 
As several contributors to this symposium have noted, apology has unique, 
almost mystical power.90 Notwithstanding all of the obstacles cited above, some 
apologies appear to cause a sudden and uncontrollable change in emotional 
states and attitudes toward the offender. 
Human-rights theorist Danielle Celermajer suggests that apology works by 
triggering recognition of an “archetypal narrative,” which she calls the 
“redemptive sequence”: transgression, repentance or apology, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, redemption.91 This archetypical narrative “has long 
functioned . . . in both religious and personal relationships.”92 When properly 
reenacted, it lessens feelings of anger and desires for revenge, diminishes 
 
 88. Graham Sirl was forced out after concluding that hunting had a valid purpose in game 
management in limited circumstances, though he remained opposed to most hunting practices. David 
Hencke & Rob Evans, Animal Welfare Groups Under Fire, GUARDIAN (London), June 29, 2001, at 8. 
 89. David Edwards, I’ll Be Victor in the Fight for Animal Rights and You’d Better Believe It; 
Annette Crosbie in Her Most Important Role, MIRROR (London), Jan. 10, 2003, at 48. 
 90. See, e.g., Rev. Dr. Kenneth R. Downes, A Reflection and Response to Using Criminal 
Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Spring 2009); 
E. Franklin Dukes, Truth, Understanding, and Repair, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (Spring 2009); 
Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Can Effective Apology Emerge through Litigation?, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 271 (Spring 2009); John O. Haley, Comment on Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both 
Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Spring 2009); Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria 
Mayo Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (Spring 2009); Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m 
Sorry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (Spring 2009); Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, A 
Biological Approach to Understanding Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Group 
Conflict, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Spring 2009);  see also NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: 
A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY & RECONCILIATION 5 (1991) (“[A]n apology, no matter how sincere or 
effective, does not and cannot undo what has been done. And yet, in a mysterious way and according to 
its own logic, this is precisely what it manages to do.”). 
 91. Celermajer, supra note 18, at 2. Celermajer discusses the work of philosopher and Talmudic 
commentator Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) on apology and transformation, and extends it to the 
political apology, for example, that given by nations to an oppressed group. 
 92. Id. 
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motivation to remain estranged from the violator, and increases feelings of 
goodwill and desire for conciliation, notwithstanding the hurtful actions.93 
Whence does this inchoate knowledge arise? Students of evolutionary 
biology point to the importance of intragroup cooperation in prehistory.94 
Developing the “emotional framework necessary for the effective use of 
apology and forgiveness” placed members of a group “at a competitive 
advantage” over individuals forced to “invest both material and psychological 
resources into non-productive activities” associated with retaliation and 
defense.95 Theologians, in contrast, point to the divine and suggest that apology 
triggers forgiveness because it is a reenactment of the forgiveness represented 
by God’s grace in the face of our own misdeeds.96 It is not necessary to choose 
among these explanations to acknowledge that, to paraphrase Justice Potter 
Stewart, “We know a good apology when we see it,”97 and we respond 
unconsciously, almost against our will. 
Celermajer describes the contours of this archetypal narrative by first 
explaining what it is not: an erasure of the history that aggravates the past injury 
by attempting to silence and oppress the victims. Instead, pointing to a 
metaphor utilized to encapsulate the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
process, Celermajer explains, “‘[W]e must read the page before we can turn 
it.’“98 Celermajer asks rhetorically, 
When we turn the page do we take its contents with us as we proceed to write the rest 
of the book? Or do we dream of a virgin sheet, untainted by the violations of the past? 
[Are] . . . the words of an apology functioning like the final wax seal stamped with care 
to terminate any dialogue with the past?99 
Rather than to erase the history, the effective apology acknowledges it and 
communicates that the speaker has experienced a lasting change of heart. 
 
 93. See Michael E. McCullough et al., Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships, 73 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 321, 321–22, 333–34 (1997). We are indebted to McCullough et al., for 
the understanding that forgiveness is not a step function, but movement in three dimensions—desire for 
retaliation, separation, and empathy—that are measurable, distinctive, and independent of one 
another. See also Michael E. McCullough et al., Forgiveness, Forbearance, and Time: The Temporal 
Unfolding of Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
540, 540, 554 (2003) (finding that peoples’ desires for retaliation and separation decrease significantly 
over time even though their motivation for benevolence does not appear to increase significantly over 
that same time period). 
 94. See Erin O’Hara & Doug Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1153–59 
(2002) (arguing that the capacity for cooperation among humans developed because those who worked 
well in groups survived at higher rates). 
 95. Id. at 1156–57. 
 96. For example, according to Christians, Jesus taught his disciples to ask God for forgiveness of 
their personal wrongdoing in these words: “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass 
against us.” Matthew 6:12. 
 97. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In this concurrence, 
Justice Potter Stewart famously attempted to explain the meaning of “hard-core” pornography or 
obscenity by saying, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it.” Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
 98. Celermajer, supra note 18, at 4 (paraphrasing ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 5 
(2000)). Boraine was deputy chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 99. Id. 
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In the act of speaking the apology, the person is acknowledging that she is the (same) 
person who committed the wrong. . . . Yet her act of apology[,] . . . aligning herself 
with concern for and recognition of the experience of the wronged other[,] bespeaks in 
the present another identity, bringing into being a person who is no longer simply the 
one who committed the wrongful act.100 
It is this expression of a change in the speaker’s identity that provides the 
spiritual alchemy that breaks the chain of causation and allows a new 
relationship to come into being.101 
One implication of Celermajer’s work is the importance of ritual to effective 
apology. One way in which ritual is important is its potential effect on the 
apology-maker. The leader must undergo an internal developmental transition 
prior to changing, and so prior to making an apology. Bridges argues that 
developmental changes are necessarily preceded by “disidentification”—a 
loosening of the old identity, in part, to make way for the new.102 
Anthropologists have long known that “rites of passage” and other public 
rituals facilitate the multiple transitions needed when a person within a group 
sheds one identity for another.103 Bridges agrees that culturally appropriate 
rituals can be transformative, dramatically accelerating an inner transition.104 It 
may be that a ritualized reenactment of the redemptive narrative can generate 
the very change of heart within the speaker for which the listeners long.105 
Whether or not ritual benefits the speaker, it is crucially important for the 
listener. To bypass such cognitive processes as selective exposure and attention, 
biased assimilation, and selective memory, and to trigger a shift to the 
associative neural network that holds the archetypal narrative plainly requires 
more than mere words. Traditional societies relied on rites. For example, a 
youth was separated from the tribe for a time in a puberty ritual, in part to 
accelerate the individual’s change in identity and in part to create a void for the 
acceptance of the new creation in the eyes of the community.106 Just as ancient 
 
 100. Id. at 7. 
 101. Id. at 7, 12. Benjamin Ho offers a more prosaic explanation—a mathematical formula 
suggesting that it is rational for an actor to accept an apology to the extent that it “acts as a signal of the 
apologizer’s fitness for future interaction.” Benjamin Ho, Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a 
Trust Game 39 (Cornell Univ., Johnson Sch. Res. Paper Series 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=944161. 
 102. WILLIAM BRIDGES, TRANSITIONS: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE’S CHANGES 115–18 (2d ed. 2004); 
see also BRIDGES, supra note 66, at 7–8 (2001) (“[I]n rites of passage people were taught important 
elements of what the tribe viewed as ‘reality,’ but . . . this learning also required unlearning the 
‘realities’ they had been taught at an earlier point in their lives.”). 
 103. See, e.g., VAN GENNEP, supra note 62. 
 104. BRIDGES, supra note 102, at 140 (“These ‘tools’ were once provided by the tribal elders in the 
form of instruction and ritual, but today we must fashion our own tools.”). 
 105. Not all scholars who study apology accept the characterization of apologetic acts as “rites of 
passage.” Nicholas Tavuchis, for example, agrees that apology is a “secular ritual,” but he distinguishes 
apology from a rite of passage, in that “[t]he crucial concern of an apology is not with new rights and 
obligations associated with a change in social status,” but with a restoration of the previolation status 
quo. Tavuchis, supra note 90, at viii, 31. 
 106. BRIDGES, supra note 102, at 102 (describing how the effort to erase the past identity was 
sometimes quite dramatic, such as a “mortuary ritual” in which the burning of the child’s sleeping mat 
might be used to dramatize that “[t]he person he used to be is dead”). 
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rituals separated the newly recognized adult from the child who had played in 
their midst, the proper symbolic acts may separate the apology-maker from the 
person who was previously despised for countenancing injurious and unjust 
acts. 
The language of ritual and symbols is even more important in group 
conflicts than in dyadic disputes because most of the intended audience cannot 
be physically present to hear what is said.107 For example, in 1970 German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt visited Poland to dedicate a memorial to thousands of 
Jews who had been slaughtered in the Warsaw Ghetto by German soldiers. On 
this occasion, with dignitaries and relatives of the lost looking on, Brandt 
walked up to the memorial alone and fell to his knees in silence.108 “His 
actions . . . came more from the heart and the gut than from any studious 
intellectual conviction,”109 one journalist wrote. As Brandt later explained, “On 
the abyss of German history and carrying the burden of the millions who were 
murdered, I did what people do when words fail them.”110 The resulting image 
had an electrifying effect, assuring a war-weary world that the new government 
represented a fundamental break with Germany’s past.111 
King Hussein’s apology to the families of the Israeli schoolgirls killed by the 
Jordanian gunman similarly reflects this element of ritual. King Hussein had a 
number of options for the appropriate ritual. He might have issued a statement 
to be read by a representative at a press conference or met the parents at some 
neutral setting. He might have invited them to his ornate throne room or 
perhaps to the more intimate setting of the private quarters of his official 
residence. Instead, he traveled to their small, politically conservative border 
town accompanied by his son, his daughter, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, and a bevy of reporters and television cameras, to visit the parents 
in their own homes. As he entered each dwelling, he knelt before the parents, 
he extended his hand, he offered words of regret, and he did so without any 
effort at self-defense or justification. Thanks to the accompanying television 
 
 107. See Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1178 
(1997) (arguing that the required gestures of an apology must be filled with meaning in order to be 
transformative). 
 108. See Facing History & Ourselves, Willy Brandt’s Silent Apology, available at 
http://www.facinghistory.org/Campus/Memorials.nsf/0/DC396F572BD4D99F85256FA80055E9B1 (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2009) (images of Brandt kneeling before the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial). 
 109. Tyler Marshall, Willy Brandt, Post WWII German Statesman, Dies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at 
A1. 
 110. See John Borneman, Can Apologies Contribute to the Peace? An Argument for Retribution, 17 
ANTHRO. E. EUR. REV. 7, 9 (1999) (quoting WILLY BRANDT, ERINNERUNGEN: MIT DEN NOTIZEN 
ZUM FALL G 214 (John Borneman trans. 1999) (1994)), available at http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe 
/aeer/v17n1/Borneman.pdf. 
 111. James O. Jackson, A Bold Peacemaker: Willy Brandt: 1913–1992, TIME, Oct. 19, 1992, at 55 
(noting that the achievements of Brandt’s lifetime were “symbolized by the somber drama of a man on 
his knees . . . a gesture that electrified the world.”). Time had named Brandt “Man of the Year” in 1970, 
declaring Brandt’s act a “turning point in the history of Europe—and of the world.” On the Road to a 
New Reality, TIME, Jan. 4, 1971, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 
942376,00.html. 
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cameras, the visual image of a Jordanian King kneeling before an Israeli citizen 
created a narrative into which people far removed from the scene could project 
their deepest longings.112 
V 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ONGOING GROUP CONFLICTS 
This article began with a question: If an effective apology is such a powerful 
tool for leaders involved in group conflicts, why does it happen so infrequently? 
It appears that an effective apology in a public dispute requires a leader to 
experience a change of heart toward the other side and the conflict and to 
perform a ritualized public-speech act which expresses this change with words 
and symbols. Yet leaders, like the rest of us, are prevented from perceiving the 
need to change by subconscious processes that screen out and discredit the 
needed information. Even if they can escape these forces, they are deterred 
from acting by internal psychological resistance and by external political threats 
to their survival. 
This section discusses three implications of the foregoing analysis for 
leaders, peacemakers, and scholars interested in apology as an instrument to 
advance justice, prevent destructive conflict, and promote cooperation. First, an 
effective apology is likely to occur only after other changes have “softened up” 
negative attitudes between the groups—referred to here as “ripeness.” Second, 
even with a degree of ripeness, apology is unlikely without a “window of 
opportunity,” a confluence of circumstances that permits the leader to limit the 
scope of the apology so as not to concede too much. Third, even if these 
conditions are satisfied, words alone are not enough for an apology to be 
effective. 
A. Ripeness 
Scholars in the field of conflict resolution have long established that no 
single tool or strategy is appropriate to all conflicts all of the time.113 In conflict 
resolution, “ripeness” denotes a situation that has evolved to the point that a 
particular intervention has a chance to work. For example, a conflict is said to 
be ripe for negotiation when the parties have reached a “mutually hurting 
stalemate.”114 
 
 112. See Schmemann, supra note 8 (“Israelis appeared to be deeply moved as they followed live 
broadcasts of the King’s visit.”). 
 113. See, e.g., GARY T. FURLONG, THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOOLBOX, MODELS AND MAPS 
FOR DIAGNOSING AND RESOLVING CONFLICT 11 (2005) (“There is no magic formula that resolves all 
disputes.”). Furlong, for example, identifies eight different conflict-resolution models that practitioners 
can use to diagnose and resolve a wide range of conflict situations that arise. Id. at 19–24 (providing an 
overview of these eight models). 
 114. See, e.g., I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 66–
78 (1982) (labeling nuclear disarmament as a stalemate since it requires joint action and the parties 
repeatedly tell each other that the “situation will both voluntarily and automatically get worse for both” 
without mutual arms control); INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7, 13, 251, 
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Applying the concept of ripeness here, an individual leader cannot be 
expected to spring from precontemplation to action without many smaller steps 
in between. Unless a transition from hostile attitudes allows the leader to come 
to see the other group as something other than devils, external calls for apology 
have the same effect as demands for relinquishment of ill-gotten gains or 
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. However frustrating it may be to 
those who see the need for an apology, so long as an individual leader or 
leadership group is caught up in precontemplation or denial, he cannot make 
the shift in perspective that is at the heart of an effective apology. 
Furthermore, even if a leader on one side is able to contemplate a significant 
change, an apologetic act is unlikely to work absent some softening of attitudes 
from the other side. It is not necessary for adversaries to arrive at a complete 
and mutual understanding; however, it is necessary for them to achieve a 
certain “analytic empathy,” which recognizes that “our opponents may act out 
of motivations as complex and multidimensional as our own,” and that their 
behavior is “reactively motivated” rather than “due to innate character flaws.”115 
Conflict-resolution scholars and practitioners have developed a massive tool kit 
to help members of competing groups discover common ground while 
understanding their differences, believing that many small-scale, incremental 
steps prepare the way for more-dramatic changes at the right time.116 
Sabatier argues that advocacy coalitions can absorb new information and 
learn but the process takes time.117 One source of new information is 
“spillovers” from other arenas that can force reconsideration of well-settled 
assumptions. For example, the bipartisan support for energy independence in 
the 1970s forced considerable changes in the advocacy coalitions involved in 
clean-air policy and utilities regulation.118 A second source of group learning is 
dramatic external events such as the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973–1974 or the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center. Finally, unexpected 
 
258–60 (Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman eds., 1985) (“One of the most important sources of 
leverage is found in the ripe moment of intolerable stalemate weighing on each party, threatening a 
worse outcome in the future while offering no present way out of the deadlock.”). 
 115. ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 44. 
 116. Search for Common Ground is an international, nonprofit organization dedicated to 
transforming “the way the world deals with conflict” by moving conflict situations “away from 
adversarial approaches, toward cooperative solutions.” Search for Common Ground, Our Mission & 
Vision, http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg /sfcg_mission.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). With a presence in 
seventeen countries, Common Ground has employed a variety of techniques and small-scale projects 
known as its “toolbox” (for example, deployed options range from radio soap operas and TV 
documentaries to athletic contests and musical productions) that can set the stage for leaders to depart 
from entrenched patterns in conflict resolution. Search for Common Ground, Our Toolbox, 
http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_toolbox.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). One of the coauthors of this article 
is the former Executive Director of U.S. Programs for Common Ground. See also WILLIAM URY, THE 
THIRD SIDE: WHY WE FIGHT AND HOW WE CAN STOP 115–206 (2000) (suggesting a myriad of 
techniques to prevent, resolve, and contain serious conflicts). 
 117. See Sabatier, supra note 57, at 19–20 (noting how changes in “socioeconomic conditions” or the 
“rise of a new systemic governing coalition” can affect an advocacy coalition’s belief system over time 
along with policy-oriented learning). 
 118. Id. at 23. 
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changes in governing elites or the leadership of the groups themselves can force 
changes in assumptions. The Republican takeover of the Presidency and the 
Senate in 1980, for example, triggered widespread adjustments by advocacy 
coalitions on many issues. 
The examples of King Hussein and Mayor Luken illustrate the need for 
ripeness and the inadvisability of expecting benefits from premature apology. 
Hussein and other Jordanians had been in direct negotiations for years leading 
up to the Camp David Accords, and Israeli attitudes toward Hussein had been 
deeply affected by his emotional eulogy at the funeral of Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin.119 Hussein’s apology and Israeli’s acceptance built on the change 
already accomplished and under way. 
In contrast, in the months leading up to the Timothy Thomas killing, Mayor 
Luken feuded publicly with civil-rights groups over alleged racism in the city as 
a whole and in the police department in particular.120 A sudden change of heart 
on the part of Luken or his critics would have been tantamount to an alcoholic 
moving from denial to a lifetime of sobriety overnight. Even though the 
situation was not ripe for an apology, the plaintiffs in the lawsuit correctly 
predicted that negotiation was possible. After an elaborate process of public 
participation involving over 3500 residents, the feuding parties, including Mayor 
Luken, the president of the local police union, and local civil-rights leaders, 
signed what is known locally as the Collaborative Agreement—a 
comprehensive plan to change police practices and transform Cincinnati police–
community relations—which became a federal-court-approved settlement to a 
pending, federal-civil-rights case against Cincinnati.121 However, in subsequent 
years Mayor Luken and the president of the local police union sought 
unsuccessfully for the consent decree to be lifted.122 Today, both officials have 
been replaced via elections with backers of the Collaborative Agreement and 
civic leaders from across the political spectrum agreeing that significant 
progress has been made in police practices and in neighborhood problem-
solving.123 
In contrast with dyadic disputes, in group conflicts, it may be that apology 
comes nearer the end of the process of reconciliation than the beginning. This is 
 
 119. Schmemann, supra note 8. 
 120. Prendergast, supra note 35 (Civil-rights leaders stated, “We need to really bring about some 
systemic change” due to “a pattern of fatal incidents involving officers and African-Americans.”). 
 121. For a full description of the data gathering, public participation, negotiation, and content 
regarding the Collaborative Agreement, see Jay Rothman, Collaboratively Addressing Police–
Community Conflict in Cincinnati, Ohio, 22 OHIO J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105, 105–32 (2006). Rothman was 
assigned by a federal district judge to serve as special master in structuring, guiding, and overseeing the 
collaborative process that resulted in the signing of the Collaborative Agreement. 
 122. Gerhardstein, supra note 90, at 274–75 (referencing the denied motion for dismissal filed by the 
city and the police union). 
 123. See, e.g., Editorial, Police Reforms, End or Beginning, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 15, 2007, 
at 2E; Dan Horn, Police Reform at 90%, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 14, 2006, at 1B (“Saul Green, 
the court-appointed monitor who oversees the deal . . . declares the police department in compliance 
with 73 of the 81 provisions in the agreement.”). 
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not meant to discourage those who long for the transformative power of a 
robust apology. But acknowledging the need for ripeness before apology may 
be akin to accepting a pilot’s decision to fly around a thunderhead even if it 
makes the plane “late.” 
B. Windows of Opportunity 
No leader can appear to confess error of his group’s entire position and 
survive politically. Yet an apology for a specific act of wrongdoing can be 
perceived as such because group conflicts are unbounded tangles of 
interconnected grievances.124 For this reason, ripeness alone is insufficient unless 
the leader can draw a boundary around a discrete piece of the broader conflict 
to limit the scope of the apology. 
One way that a window of opportunity opens is an unexpected occurrence 
or event which captures public attention and creates a mini-drama. Natural 
disasters, serious confrontations, or extreme acts of violence often have this 
effect. Hussein was able to isolate the border incident from other areas of 
disagreement and to make an unqualified apology for the death of the Israeli 
schoolchildren without appearing to abandon or qualify his positions on Jewish 
settlements, the Palestinian “right of return,” or the status of Jerusalem. 
Importantly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apparently saw 
benefits from allowing Hussein to frame the event in this way.125 In contrast, 
Mayor Luken’s critics immediately argued that Timothy Thomas’s death was 
part of a pattern of police misconduct, making it difficult for the mayor to 
apologize for police conduct in Thomas’s case without conceding the entire 
argument to his critics.126 Windows of opportunity created by events can be 
fleeting. Once a leader has asserted a defense or justification, apology requires 
a confession of error—something politicians are universally loath to do.127 
A leadership change is another way to limit the scope of an apology. For 
example, a city manager settled a racial-profiling case by agreeing to a written, 
 
 124. See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 10–11 (noting the distinctive characteristics of identity conflict 
as rooted in “existential and underlying psychocultural concerns” that make identity-based conflicts 
“very complex, relatively intangible, and often hard to define clearly”). 
 125. Schmemann, supra note 8 (“At the news conference, Mr. Netanyahu argued against making 
[the border incident] or any one issue into a focus of confrontation. ‘I think it’s a mistake to try to 
create an end-all and be-all on one issue.’”). 
 126. Luken had publicly pledged to correct problems with police use of force in 1999. Perry 
Brothers, Mayor: Policies to Be Reviewed, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 21, 1999, at 1A. 
 127. Recent research shows that political leaders who apologize and reverse their positions are seen 
as weak, even by voters who agree that the original position was wrong. See Larissa Z. Tiedens, Anger 
and Advancement Versus Sadness and Subjugation: The Effect of Negative Emotion Expressions on 
Social Status Conferral, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86, 87–90 (2001) (finding that 
participants in a study conferred more power and status on President Clinton as a political leader when 
he responded to grand-jury testimony regarding the Monica Lewinsky affair with anger rather than 
sadness, even though the participants later believed Clinton would be “best served by expressing 
sadness rather than anger”). 
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public apology to be disclosed in open court.128 Because the city manager was 
relatively new, his apology amounted to a declaration about the future rather 
than a confession that he had condoned or overlooked racism in the police 
department in the past. Because of the lawsuit, the city manager could also 
defend against internal criticism as necessary to prevent an even heavier blow 
to the city’s reputation and finances. 
The passage of time is another way for a window of opportunity to develop. 
On issues such as slavery and segregation, in which responsibility for the wrong 
is widely shared, ascension to power by a new generation makes it safer for the 
new leaders to apologize without a revolt from line workers or key 
constituencies. For example, President Bill Clinton apologized for the National 
Health Service’s notorious Tuskegee Syphilis experiment twenty-five years 
after it was concluded, well after the key figures associated with the project had 
retired or died.129 
C. The Symbolic Communication 
Although ripeness and a window of opportunity are necessary preconditions 
for a leader to consider making an apology, effectiveness is measured by how 
others react. Much of the existing scholarship on apology focuses almost 
exclusively on language and logic,130 but words alone are not enough if 
forbearance and forgiveness depend on recognition of an archetypal narrative. 
An effective apology appears to require some form of appropriate ritual through 
a symbolic, public-speech act that flies below the radar of the cognitive defenses 
sustaining bitter hostility. 
This observation raises more questions than it answers. Different rituals 
signal that an apology is being delivered for different cultural groups.131 In the 
United States, common rituals include televised statements by public officials as 
 
 128. Gerhardstein, supra note 90, at 274–76; see also Sue Kiesewetter, Fairfield to Analyze One Year 
of Police Stops, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 1, 2007, at 1b. 
 129. Cesar Chelala, Clinton Apologises to the Survivors of Tuskegee, 349 LANCET 1529, 1529 (1997) 
(“President Clinton’s apology, on May 16, for harm done to participants of the now infamous Tuskegee 
Study has been greeted with relief and gratitude by the experiment’s survivors and their families.”). 
Some scholars suggest that Clinton’s apology was insufficient to overcome African Americans’ mistrust 
of medical research. See, e.g., Heather J. Carmack et al., Narrative Constructions of Health Care Issues 
and Policies: The Case of President Clinton’s Apology-by-Proxy for the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, 
29 J. MED. HUMAN. 89, 96–103 (2008) (deeming Clinton’s national apology an “incomplete rhetorical 
act” primarily because the public discourse following the speech focused on the nation’s guilt rather 
than policy proposals and actions that will generate a material change in “reconciling mainstream 
medicine and minority communities”). 
 130. See, e.g., AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 303 (2004) (sole entry in index is to “ritual 
apologies,” which are sham apologies or ritualistic gestures devoid of sincere intentions); PINCHAS H. 
PELI, SOLOVEITCHIK ON REPENTANCE: THE THOUGHT AND ORAL DISCOURSES OF RABBI JOSEPH 
B. SOLOVEITCHIK 91–92 (1984) (“Feelings, emotions, thoughts and ideas become clear and are grasped 
only after they are expressed in sentences bearing a logical and grammatical structure. . . . Repentance 
contemplated, and not verbalized, is valueless.”) (emphasis added). 
 131. See KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION 57–72 (1998) (arguing that 
communication between groups in conflict is always distorted by cultural differences that cause 
different meanings to be attached to words and gestures). 
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well as public introspection involving the disclosure of extremely personal 
matters. In contrast, in Japan, specific rituals are required.132 After a U.S. 
submarine collided with and sank a Japanese fishing boat, U.S. officials 
attempted multiple U.S.-style apologies to no avail. The Japanese were 
unmoved by a presidential letter, official visits from the U.S. Ambassador and 
the Admiral of the Fleet,133 and an anguished editorial in Time by the 
submarine’s commander, Scott Waddle.134 Waddle “should get on his knees and 
bow his head to the floor,” insisted one of the victims’ fathers.135 Not even 
Waddle’s determination to take the witness stand in a military court of inquiry 
against the advice of counsel and tearfully accept sole responsibility for the 
accident was sufficient: “Kazuo Nakata, father of one of the Japanese lost on 
the sunken boat [,] sat each day at the inquiry filled with anger, until he met 
Waddle face to face and accepted his apologies . . . ‘He bowed to me, and a tear 
fell to the floor. In that moment we were two human beings.’”136 
The importance of ritual offers an explanation for the value victims 
sometimes attach to public apologies in civil-rights litigation.137 Even when 
coerced, as by plaintiffs’ insistence on public statements that acknowledge 
wrongdoing and express some form of regret, these statements are culturally 
appropriate rituals conveying a message that the future is expected to be 
different from the past, and that message can apparently be conveyed 
separately from the state of mind of the person who writes or recites the 
words.138 
D. Remaining Questions and Future Directions 
This article is largely conceptual. Because no effort has been made to test 
the analysis against a comprehensive list of historical events, an obvious 
question is whether the suggested conditions for an effective apology in group 
conflicts—ripeness, a window of opportunity, and appropriate ritual—are 
consistent with past experience. Even if so, is it useful only post hoc, or could it 
help people make better choices in active disputes? Does the suggested model 
explain the absence of apology in situations that leave outsiders shaking their 
heads in disbelief? (The Armenian genocide comes to mind.) How much 
“softening up” needs to occur for conditions to be ripe for an apology, and how 
 
 132. See Haley, supra note 90; see also LAZARE, supra note 130, at 31–34, 210–13 (contrasting the 
American and Japanese approaches to “apology” as rooted in profound linguistic and cultural 
differences between the two societies); TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, 37–43 (referring to Japan as the 
“apologetic society par excellence”). 
 133. David J. Jefferson, Searching the Depths, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 44; Rowan 
Scarborough, Navy to Probe 4th Sub Officer, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at A1. 
 134. Scott Waddle & Terry McCarthy, I Was Begging God, TIME, Mar. 12, 2001, at 52 (“I will make 
apologies in person when the opportunity presents itself. If I have to get in a rowboat and row to Japan, 
that is what I will do.”). 
 135. Jefferson, supra note 133, at 44. 
 136. Terry McCarthy, The Right Thing to Do, TIME, Apr. 2, 2001, at 29 (emphasis added). 
 137. See White, supra note 90; Gerhardstein, supra note 90. 
 138. Ho, supra note 101, at 22–24, 36–37, 39–41. 
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would advisors to a leader sense when the time was ripe? What factors open a 
window of opportunity, and what does it look like at the time? Can such a 
window be precipitated deliberately or must leaders await developments 
beyond their control? Finally, leaders and practitioners might benefit from 
more scholarly attention to symbols and rituals that allow an apology to be 
heard, especially when the different groups involved do not share the same 
cultural heritage. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Articles on apology and forgiveness tend to be grounded in real disputes in 
which serious wrongs have been committed and the blameworthiness of the 
parties is not symmetrical. One implication of this article is the need for scholars 
to develop a more nuanced view of leaders whose groups are responsible for 
wrongful acts. An effective apology by a leader in a group conflict requires a 
personal, internal journey through loss and ambiguity (ambiguity enhanced, 
perhaps, through their followers’ expectations of public displays of certainty) 
followed by a public act that can entail enormous personal and political risks.139 
No one, scholars included, is exempt from selective cognitive processing, 
groupthink, or resistance to transition. Perceiving that “everything bad they do 
against us is innate and characteristic; [but] everything we do against them is 
reactive and situational”140 is as tempting for scholars as it is for people caught 
up in a conflict. 
This is not to imply that opposing groups are always equally blameworthy 
(for they are not), nor to suggest the suspension of judgment regarding a 
particular conflict, whether it is slavery in the nineteenth century or ecosystem 
destruction in the twenty-first century. Rather, it is to argue that scholars need 
to practice “project[ing] [themselves] into the circumstances in which [leaders] 
operate,”141 what Adam Smith calls “sympathy”142 and what has more recently 
 
 139. Willy Brandt was criticized by many Germans for his gesture at the Warsaw memorial. John 
Borneman, Public Apologies as Performative Redress, 25 SAIS REVIEW 53, 55 (2005) (“Back home in 
Bonn, some critics attacked Brandt’s Kniefall, claiming it was exaggerated. . . . To some Germans, 
Brandt’s apologetic gesture on behalf of all Germans recalled his wartime resistance and suggested 
disloyalty to the German cause.”). Anwar Sadat’s decision to go public with his shift away from total 
hostility to Israel cost him his life. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Randal, Arabs Celebrating Sadat’s Death Saw 
Him as a Double-Dealer, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1981, at A25 (noting the “lack of a display of compassion 
for the fallen leader” and the “outpourings of hatred” from many in the Arab states who saw his 
willingness to negotiate as a “betrayal”). 
 140. ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 44. 
 141. Nir Eisikovits, Forget Forgiveness: On the Benefits of Sympathy for Political Reconciliation, 105 
THEORIA 31, 39 (2004). 
 142. For an explanation of the importance of David Hume’s differing concept of “sympathy” to 
apology and forgiveness (defined as “a ‘principle of communication’ which allows us to feel what those 
around us feel”), see id. at 40–41. 
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been termed “analytic empathy,”143 especially as it applies to those who are 
powerful and wrong. Otherwise, scholars risk unwittingly violating a maxim that 
applies as much to scholarship as to medicine: First, do no harm. 
 
 
 143. ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 44. “Although we can never come to see the world as our 
adversaries do, nor necessarily accept their assertions as correct, we can begin to understand their 
viewpoints and assumptions as contextually legitimate.” Id. at 45. 
